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Abstract
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel con-
trol in post-reform China. Employing the turnover data of top provincial leaders in
China between 1979 and 1995, we ﬁnd that the likelihood of promotion of provincial
leaders increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of termination
decreases with their economic performance. This ﬁnding is robust to various sensitivity
tests. We also ﬁnd that the turnover of provincial leaders is more sensitive to their
average performance over their tenure than to their annual performance. We inter-
pret these empirical ﬁndings as evidence that China uses personnel control to induce
desirable economic outcomes. Our study adds some basic evidence to a growing theo-
retical literature emphasizing the role of political incentives of government oﬃcials in
promoting local economic growth.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H11; H7; J63; P31 Introduction
In the course of China’s remarkable economic growth since the late 1970s, local government
oﬃcials have been playing an active role in building local infrastructure, encouraging local
businesses and attracting foreign investment. The strong pro-business role of Chinese local
oﬃcials stands in stark contrast with the rent-seeking behavior (the “grabbing hand”) of
local oﬃcials in other transitional and developing countries (Krueger 1974; Frye and Shleifer
1997).
Two principal explanations have been put forward for why Chinese oﬃcials behave so
diﬀerently. The ﬁrst, based on what has come to be known as “market-preserving federal-
ism,” argues that the pro-business incentives given to Chinese local oﬃcials are a result of
a policy of ﬁscal decentralization and high-powered intergovernmental ﬁscal revenue-sharing
contracts (Oi, 1992; Montinola et al., 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1997; Weingast, 1995; Mck-
innon, 1997).1 Employing provincial-level data, Jin et al. (2000) ﬁnd empirical evidence
which supports the ﬁscal decentralization view.
However, a more recent explanation emphasizes the role of political incentives or career
concerns on the part of local oﬃcials in China. According to this view, the readiness of the
Chinese central government to reward and punish local oﬃcials on the basis of their economic
performance motivates them to promote the local economy (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001).
The reward and punishment mechanisms are made possible within the multidivisional-form
(M-form) structure of the Chinese economic system, which allows yardstick competition
among local oﬃcials (Qian and Xu, 1993; Maskin et al., 2000). Although anecdotal evi-
dence shows that Chinese cadres are evaluated in accordance with their economic perfor-
mance (Whiting, 2001), no systematic body of empirical evidence has been presented on
the relationship between the career mobility of Chinese local oﬃcials and their economic
performance.
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between the turnover of
1Some studies relate the positive incentives given to local oﬃcials to a number of other economic factors,
such as the emergence of local government ownership as a credible institutional device to avoid state predation
(Che and Qian, 1998) and inter-regional competition in the product and capital markets (Li et al., 2000;
Qian and Roland, 1998).
1Chinese provincial leaders and their economic performance in the post-reform period. Using
the ordered probit model, we ﬁnd that the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders
increases with their economic performance while the likelihood of termination decreases
with their economic performance. This ﬁnding is robust to various sensitivity tests. We also
ﬁnd that the turnover of provincial leaders is more sensitive to their average performance
over their tenure than to their annual performance. We interpret these empirical ﬁndings as
evidence that China uses personnel control to induce desirable economic outcomes.
Our paper draws extensively on the growing empirical literature on the political incen-
tives of government oﬃcials both in the Chinese context and in general. In a study of the
comparative advantage of M-form versus U-form, Maskin et al. (2000) ﬁnd that the political
status of a Chinese province (measured by the number of Central Committee members) is
correlated with the provincial economic ranking. However, they do not establish a direct
link between the career mobility of provincial leaders and their economic performance.2 In
a diﬀerent political setting, Besley and Case (1996) show that the economic performance of
a state relative to neighboring states has a positive impact on the re-election prospects of
US governors.3
Our paper is also closely related to the empirical literature on the career concerns of
ﬁrm managers. Both our methodology and ﬁndings are similar to those of studies on career
concerns of managers in western corporations (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Weisbach,
1988).4 In fact, the evidence presented in this paper supports the characterization of the
Chinese economy as being run in such a way that provincial leaders act as middle managers
of a large corporation and their internal career mobility, which is controlled by headquarters,
is closely tied to their economic performance.
Our paper also has a bearing on a study by Groves et al. (1995). They show that in the
1980s, the Chinese industrial bureaus selected managers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
on the basis of ﬁrm performance. Since Chinese SOE managers are semi-oﬃcials situated in
2Also, their simple regression may be subject to the omitted variables bias.
3In a related study, Besley and Case (1995) examine how re-election probabilities of US gubernatorial
oﬃcials aﬀect their choices of economic policy.
4See also a comprehensive survey by Murphy (1999).
2the bureaucratic hierarchy, this manager selection rule reﬂects a general shift in personnel
control since the late 1970s from the political criterion to the performance criterion. While
their evidence indicates that local governments were performance-conscious when selecting
SOE managers, our ﬁnding about the incentive role of personnel control at the provincial
level actually oﬀers an explanation for why local governments acted in this way.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section brieﬂy de-
scribes the institutional background pertaining to the personnel control system in China,
especially during the reform period 1979-1995. Section 3 outlines the econometric speciﬁ-
cation and puts forward our main hypothesis to be tested. Section 4 describes the data.
Section 5 presents empirical results. Section 6 conducts some sensitivity tests. Section 7
concludes.
2 Internal Career Mobility and Personnel Control in
China
China is a unitary state, and its political system is broadly composed of ﬁve layers of state ad-
ministration: the center (zhongyang), provinces (sheng), prefectures (diqu), counties (xian),
and townships (xiang).5 The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
acts as the headquarters of this “multidivisional” system, which ultimately controls the mo-
bility of government oﬃcials within the system. This highly centralized structure of personnel
control remains intact even to this day.
Provinces are the second level of China’s political hierarchy. As of today, excluding
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, China has 31 provincial units—four centrally adminis-
trated cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing, and Chongqing), 22 provinces and ﬁve autonomous
regions.6 A province ranks at the same level as a ministry in the central government. The
top position at the provincial level is that of the provincial party secretary, followed imme-
diately by the provincial governor. This reﬂects the dual presence of the communist party
and government organs at each level of China’s political hierarchy.7
5See Lieberthal (1995) for a comprehensive description of the Chinese political system.
6We will call all provincial-level units provinces in the rest of the paper.
7Because the governance structures at all levels are similar, the basic observations we obtain from
3China began its far-reaching economic reforms in 1978. These reforms have allowed
provinces to play a much more important role in economic management than the ministries
at the center which were traditionally in charge of planning and coordination, reﬂecting
the strategic importance of provincial leaders (Qian and Xu, 1993; Huang, 1996). Moreover,
reforms have also empowered provincial leaders with the ultimate authority in allocating eco-
nomic resources in their provinces. Their political and economic decisions greatly inﬂuence
the economic performance of these provinces. For this reason, they are also held accountable
for the corresponding results arising from their decisions. To a degree, provincial leaders are
just like the middle-level managers in a multidivisional corporation who are responsible for
their divisional performance.
China’s reform of its personnel control system coincided with the beginning of its
economic reforms. A crucial turnaround in personnel management was the wholesale change
in the evaluation criteria for government oﬃcials. Political conformity, which was the only
important pre-reform criterion for promotion, gave way to economic performance and other
competence-related indicators. Although political loyalty remains important, three new
elements were introduced into the evaluation process. Oﬃcials had to be of a young age, have
good education and demonstrate expertise in administrative management. Above all, local
economic performance became the most important criterion for higher-level oﬃcials assessing
lower-level oﬃcials. One revealing indication of the importance of economic performance for
local oﬃcials is their “obsession” with economic ranking among peers. Government reports
or provincial yearbooks often contain detailed information on the relative rankings of the
provincial performance, ranging from GDP growth, to steel production, to miles of road
constructed.
In 1980, for the ﬁrst time in its history, the CCP oﬃcially proposed the abolition of the
lifetime appointment of party and government oﬃcials and installed a mandatory retirement
system. Under this new regime, provincial leaders are required to retire at the age of 65 if
they are not promoted to higher positions in the central government. According to the new
provincial-level data may also apply to lower levels. Casual observations seem to support this conception
(Whiting, 2001).
4policy, many senior provincial leaders were urged to leave oﬃce to make way for younger
people. The reform, which was implemented in 1982, led to two large waves of retirement
in 1983 and 1985. However, like many other policies in China, the mandatory retirement
age was not strictly enforced, and this remained the case even in 1995, the last year of our
sample period.
The economic and political reforms have made provincial leaders operate within a well-
deﬁned career structure inside the Chinese political hierarchy. The promotion opportunities
that lie ahead for provincial secretaries include membership of the State Council, the vice-
premiership, the premiership and membership of the Politburo or the Politburo Standing
Committee. Provincial governors, at one level lower than party secretaries, can also move
up to the level of provincial party secretary or to equal-ranking positions in ministries or
commissions at the center. A promotion in this paper means a move by a provincial leader
up to one of these positions.
Apart from promotions, terminations, including retirement and demotions, can also
serve as an incentive mechanism. Typically, provincial leaders do not retire in the full sense
immediately after leaving oﬃce unless there are exceptional circumstances, such as poor
health. Before retiring oﬃcially, they are often assigned, as a transition, to an honorary yet
virtually powerless position, such as director of the provincial People’s Congress or chair-
man of the provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference. Some are given honorary
positions on the National People’s Congress or the National People’s Political Consultative
Conference. Whatever gloss may be put on it, the loss of power is what marks the end of an
oﬃcial’s political career. Therefore, in this paper, we deﬁne retirement as any departure from
secretaryship or governorship that is not followed by a lateral move or promotion. Although
demotion is diﬀerent from retirement, we have not been able to identify many demotions
in the data. Publicly announced demotions were very rare, and a seemingly routine retire-
ment may well disguise a dismissal. Because of the subtle diﬀerence between retirement and
demotion, we group them together, and call both terminations.
It is worth noting one peculiarity in the career proﬁles of provincial leaders. Unlike
5corporate managers or politicians in western societies, Chinese government oﬃcials have few
options outside the internal political labor market. If a provincial leader is separated from
the government hierarchy, there is virtually no avenue for her/him to ﬁnd a job elsewhere.8
In this sense, it may be appropriate to treat the Chinese political hierarchy as a single
internal labor market without outside options. The lock-in eﬀect, coupled with the huge
diﬀerence in terms of personal beneﬁts between staying in power and relinquishing power,
greatly reinforces the incentive for Chinese oﬃcials to hold onto their power.9
To summarize, the following organizational features of the Chinese personnel control
system are important for the purposes of this study. First, personnel control is centralized
in the hands of the central government, and the economic performance of provincial leaders
is a crucial indicator in personnel evaluations. Second, the M-form structure of the Chinese
economy makes each provincial leader’s performance individually distinguishable and com-
parable and thereby allows for a sensible link between performance and turnover. Third,
government oﬃcials move up in the internal political labor market, and there is virtually
no outside opportunity. Therefore, their concerns about their prospect of promotion and
termination become a very important incentive mechanism to motivate provincial leaders to
build up the provincial economy.
3 Econometric Speciﬁcation
Our aim in this paper is to examine the incentive role of personnel control in China by
exploring the link between political turnover and economic performance. Given the fact
that the crucial sources of career concerns for Chinese provincial leaders are the prospects
of promotion and termination, a natural approach is to examine directly how these turnover
prospects relate to the economic performance achieved by leaders while they are in the post.
We employ the ordered probit model to examine the probability of promotion and
8This statement is valid for the sample period we study in this paper. Things have begun to change
since the mid-1990s as China’s private sector, relatively free from the Party’s control, has grown into a large
employer in the labor market.
9Terminated provincial leaders may hold leading positions in the People’s Congress or People’s Consul-
tative Conference, and they can retain certain privileges, such as having secretaries and cars. But since
these positions carry no direct executive power, terminated oﬃcials have lost the major source of beneﬁts
associated with such power.
6termination for provincial leaders. Suppose that the central government gives each provincial
leader an evaluation score, y∗,10 every year, and makes promotion and termination decisions
based on this score. However, we do not observe this score. We only observe the turnover
of a provincial leader, or the variable y, which equals 0 for a termination, 1 for remaining at
the same level (including lateral moves as well as staying in the same position), and 2 for a
promotion. Assume that the latent evaluation score y∗ is a linear function of our independent
variables x, or y∗ = xβ + , where β is a vector of coeﬃcients and  is assumed to follow
a standard normal distribution. Deﬁne α1 and α2 as the two cutoﬀ points of y∗, which the
turnover decisions are based on. More speciﬁcally, a provincial leader is terminated (y = 0) if
y∗ ≤ α1, stays at the same level (y = 1) if α1 < y∗ ≤ α2, and is promoted (y = 2) if y∗ > α2.
Following the notation in Wooldridge (2002), the Ordered probit model is expressed as
Prob(yi = 0|x) = Φ(α1 − xβ), (1)
Prob(yi = 1|x) = Φ(α2 − xβ) − Φ(α1 − xβ), (2)
Prob(yi = 2|x) = 1 − Φ(α2 − xβ), (3)
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
Since we are more interested in the marginal eﬀects of x on the probability of promotion
and termination than the coeﬃcients β themselves, we need to transform the estimated β
into the marginal eﬀects. Deﬁne the probability of termination, remaining at the same level
and promotion as p0, p1 and p2. Following Wooldridge (2002) (page 506), the marginal
eﬀects for the k-th variable are calculated according to the following formula.
∂p0/∂xk = −ˆ βkφ(ˆ α1 − xˆ β), (4)
∂p1/∂xk = ˆ βk[φ(ˆ α1 − xˆ β) − φ(ˆ α2 − xˆ β)], (5)
∂p2/∂xk = ˆ βkφ(ˆ α2 − xˆ β), (6)
where φ is the standard normal density function, and the variables with hats are estimated
parameters from the model. In the empirical section, we report the coeﬃcients for variables,
but interpret results by calculating these marginal eﬀects.
10To simplify notation, we ignore the subscript i for a leader and t for a year.
7The key variable in x is the economic performance of a province. In this paper, we
use the provincial GDP growth as the measure of provincial economic performance. As in-
troduced in more detail in Section 5, we use both the annual growth rate and the weighted
average growth rates during a leader’s tenure as performance measures. Using these perfor-
mance measures, our main hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 1: The probability of promotion (termination) for provincial leaders increases
(decreases) with the provincial economic performance.
Besides the GDP growth rate, the characteristics of provincial leaders may aﬀect their
likelihood of promotion and termination. Provincial leaders’ personal attributes such as
education, age and tenure of oﬃce are included in our estimations to control their eﬀects
on turnover.11 Education, an indicator variable that equals one for leaders with college
education and zero otherwise, measures a leader’s human capital, and thus we expect it
to have a positive (negative) eﬀect on promotion (termination). Age has become a critical
variable determining turnover, especially terminations after the age-based retirement rule
was implemented in 1982. To capture the potential nonlinear eﬀect of age on the probability
of turnover, and in particular the eﬀect of the 65-years-of-age retirement rule, we add a
dummy variable “age65” which equals one if the leader is 65 or older and zero otherwise.
We also control tenure in the regressions, which measures how many years a leader has been
in the post.
Provincial leaders’ connections with the central government could also aﬀect the like-
lihood of turnover. A provincial leader’s experience in the central government may allow
her/him to maintain stronger connections with the center and better knowledge of the work-
ings of central appointment procedures, which will result in better turnover prospects. The
central experience can also help the leader cultivate informal connections with central lead-
ers who can inﬂuence personnel evaluations.12 Although connection with the center is so
11Given the fact that there is a time lag between the steps taken by provincial leaders and the results of
their eﬀorts in the form of economic growth, we match provincial GDP growth with leaders in the following
way: the current year’s provincial GDP growth rate applies to a leader if he/she is promoted/terminated
after July of this year, otherwise the previous year’s GDP growth rate applies as the performance measure.
12Local oﬃcials’ connections with the central government have attracted a lot of attention in the literature
of the Chinese political economy (Huang, 1996; Jin et al., 2000). It is believed that provincial leaders with
8important, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical study has been undertaken that di-
rectly links this factor to the career mobility of provincial leaders. We will include central
connection in our empirical analysis to examine the eﬀect of political connections on career
mobility. The central connection variable is an indictor that equals one for leaders having
previous experience or holding joint-appointment in the central government, and equals zero
otherwise.
Our regressions also take into consideration the eﬀect of both provincial characteristics
and cyclical policy shocks common to all provinces.13 The level of development of a province
could aﬀect the career prospects of its leaders. We use the lagged provincial per capita
GDP to control for this potential eﬀect. The provincial location could also matter in a
leader’s likelihood of promotion. For example, starting from 1979, the central government
introduced a variety of preferential economic policies that favor coastal provinces, such as
Guangdong and Fujian. One may wonder whether the central government has a special
preference towards the leaders in those coastal areas. In order to control for the potential
bias of turnover decisions in favor of certain areas, we include a set of provincial indicators
in x.
Evidence shows that central policies regarding personnel management change over time.
For example, our data show that there were two large waves of retirement in 1983 and 1985
after the central government implemented the mandatory retirement rules (see next section).
There is also a cyclical pattern in that many personnel changes occur around the time of the
party congress and people’s congress held every ﬁve years. To control for the eﬀect of policy
changes over time and political cycles, we include a set of year indicators in estimating the
ordered probit model.14
To summarize, we have the following control variables in the ordered probit model that
estimates the eﬀect of economic performance on turnover: the leader’s age, age65, education,
prior or current central experience tend to have more attachment to the center and to be thereby more
compliant with central policies. Alternatively, the central experience may also indicate a lack of local
knowledge, which may have a negative eﬀect on economic performance.
13We are very thankful to an anonymous referee for making this suggestion.
14Controlling for both cyclical and provincial eﬀects provides us with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of
the eﬀects of performance on the likelihood of turnover. It also helps address the concerns about the eﬀects
of performance relative to national or provincial benchmarks on the probability of turnover.
9tenure, a central connection indicator, the lagged provincial per capita GDP, and a whole
set of provincial and year indicators.
4 Data
The data used in this study cover 254 provincial leaders (provincial party secretaries and
governors) who served in 28 Chinese provincial units from 1979 to 1995.15 Information on
these leaders is compiled from two books published in Chinese: Who’s Who in the Chinese
Communist Party (1997) and The Documentation of Administration in the People’s Republic
of China (1996). The dataset contains detailed personal information about these leaders,
including their age, education and work experience prior to the current appointment, with
special note taken of whether they have ever held a position in the central government.
The data also track down the month and year in which they took and/or left oﬃce and the
nature of the turnover—promotion, lateral moves, staying at the same position or retirement.
Economic performance data come from the relevant issues of the China Statistical Yearbook.
Some leaders may hold multiple positions at diﬀerent times, or even simultaneously.
For example, 37 provincial governors were promoted to party secretaryship during the sam-
ple period. These party secretaries are treated as diﬀerent persons from the time of their
promotion, because the promotion has already reﬂected their past performance and any fu-
ture evaluations need to be based on their performance in the new job. Ten party secretaries
were jointly appointed as governors in the same province. We count them as party secretaries
since this reﬂects their real political rank. In four instances, a party secretary or governor
moved laterally to another province. Again, we treat them as diﬀerent persons once the
lateral moves have occurred. In total, we have 864 leader-year observations with complete
information.
In order for us to see the disciplinary and incentive roles played by centralized personnel
control, the turnover in this “internal labor market” needs to be suﬃciently frequent. This
15Two provincial units, Tibet and Hainan, are excluded from the sample because Tibet has a very special
policy status while Hainan is a spin-oﬀ from Guangdong province, only becoming a separate province in
1988. In any event, including Tibet and Hainan in the sample does not change the qualitative results.
10is indeed the case.16 More than 70 percent of leaders in our sample experienced turnover in
the sample period. The average annual turnover rate is more than 20 percent, which is very
close to that of U.S. top executives (generally around 20 percent) documented in Denis and
Denis (1995) and Warner et al. (1988).17
To examine the trend of the turnover rate, we plot the frequencies of both promotions
and terminations for each year in Figure 1. As seen from the ﬁgure, the termination rate is
more volatile than the promotion rate. There were two large waves of retirements in 1983
and 1985 after the central government implemented the mandatory retirement rules. Many
provincial secretaries and governors were urged to step down during that period. Compared
to retirement, the incidence of promotion was relatively stable, around four incidences per
year.
An important variable for the study of turnover is the age of provincial leaders. Table
1 shows that the average age of provincial leaders is about 60.4 years, varying from 43 to 75
years. To examine the correlation between turnover and age, we describe the distribution
of turnover by age group for both the whole sample and the post-1985 sub-sample in Table
2. There are three categories of turnover: promotion, termination and remaining at the
same level (including staying in the same position and lateral moves). Note ﬁrst that even
though there are a signiﬁcant number of provincial leaders younger than 50, none of them
were promoted or terminated below the age of 50. The majority of promotion cases were
leaders between the ages of 50-64 for both the whole sample and the post-1985 sub-sample.
Terminations are more evenly distributed, but peak between the ages of 65-67.
In the study of terminations, we need to make sure that at least some of the termi-
nations are disciplinary terminations rather than normal retirements, in particular for the
post-1985 sample. Comparing the whole sample with the post-1985 sub-sample (Table 2),
we can see that forced retirement at the age of 65 indeed has a signiﬁcant role. No provincial
16Another necessary condition is that the central government has the ultimate authority to appoint or
remove provincial leaders. The authority of the center is beyond any doubt, since the political system in
China is highly centralized.
17Following Denis and Denis (1995), this rate is deﬁned as the total turnover number divided by the total
number of province-years in the sample. Since each province has two top leaders, we double the total number
of province-years to calculate the overall annual turnover rate.
11leaders were older than 68 in the post-1985 sub-sample. Moreover, in the post-1985 sub-
sample, a signiﬁcant number of terminations happened at exactly the age of 65 (25 percent
of the termination cases). However, the age of retirement rule was still not strictly enforced.
Even in the post-1985 sub-sample, for the group of leaders at age 65 or above, there are
more cases of leaders remaining at the same level (24 cases) than terminations (21 cases).
Two leaders were even promoted at the age of 66. Examining the termination cases only,
a signiﬁcant number of terminations (more than 40 percent of the total number) occurred
beyond the retirement age of 65. The fact that some provincial leaders were terminated at
the “normal” retirement age or even younger, but others stayed or were promoted at the
same or older ages implies that certain variables other than age must have played a disci-
plinary role in leader turnover. We will examine whether economic performance is such a
disciplinary variable in the next section.
Table 1 also shows that in the period 1979-1995, China achieved a very rapid growth
rate. The average annual growth rate was more than 10 percent.18 However, the growth rate
varies widely across provinces and over time with a standard deviation of six percent. The
fastest growth rate (more than ﬁfty percent) occurred in Yunnan Province in 1994, while the
slowest (negative 16 percent) occurred in Gansu Province, also in 1994. The large variation
of the growth rate is important for us to identify how it is correlated with leader turnover.
Other independent variables are also described in Table 1. More than half (62 percent)
of provincial leaders have a college degree, which shows that the central government indeed
tried hard to promote well-educated cadres. About 23 percent of provincial leaders have
connections with the center. The average tenure of oﬃce in the sample is 3.03 years, with
some leaders staying as long as 12 years. Since the oﬃcial term for a provincial leader is
ﬁve, the average of 3.03 years indicates a considerable degree of turnover.
5 Turnover and Economic Performance: The Evidence
In this section we present evidence on the impact of economic performance on the turnover of
provincial leaders. We use both the annual GDP growth rate and the average GDP growth
18The annual provincial GDP is calculated at 1980 prices.
12rate over a leader’s tenure as performance measures.
5.1 Turnover and Annual Performance
Table 3 reports maximum likelihood estimation results of an ordered probit model using the
entire sample that pools party secretaries and governors together. To allow for heterogeneity
across observations, we estimate the ordered probit model with the robust standard errors
option.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 3, we report a regression with the annual GDP growth
and provincial and year indicators as independent variables. Consistent with our hypothesis,
the annual GDP growth rate has a positive impact on the probability of promotion and a
negative impact on the probability of termination. The sign of the coeﬃcient of annual
growth rate is positive, and is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. Moreover, the marginal
eﬀects of economic growth on turnover are reasonably large. The marginal eﬀects of the
annual growth rate when evaluated at the mean of the independent variables are 0.188 for
promotion and -0.251 for termination. These numbers mean that when the annual growth
rate increases by one standard deviation (0.06) from the mean (0.10), the probability of
promotion will increase by 0.011, or 15 percent of the average probability of promotion
(0.075), and the probability of termination will decrease by 0.015, which is also 15 percent
of the average probability of termination (0.103).
We next report a regression that includes age, age65, tenure, education, central con-
nection and the lagged provincial per capita GDP as control variables (Table 3, column 2).
With these variables controlled, the annual GDP growth has about the same marginal eﬀects
on the probabilities of promotion and termination. The eﬀects of both age and age65 are
negative and signiﬁcant at the one percent level. The marginal eﬀect of age for promotion
is slightly smaller in absolute value than that for termination (-0.003 versus 0.004). An
increase of age by one year from the mean of 60 will decrease the probability of promotion
by 0.3 percentage points, and will increase the probability of termination by 0.4 percentage
points. The eﬀect of age65 on promotion is very large. Reaching the age of 65 will reduce the
probability of promotion by 0.055, or 73 percent of the average probability of promotion, and
13will increase the probability of termination by 0.09, or 87 percent of the average probability
of termination.
The regression also shows that previous or current work experience in the central
government increases (decreases) the probability of promotion (termination). The central
connection indicator has a positive coeﬃcient, and it is signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
Moreover, the magnitude of this eﬀect is large. Having central connections increases the
probability of promotion by 3.4 percentage points and decreases the probability of termina-
tion by 3.5 percentage points. This result seems to be consistent with the argument that
experience at the center helps cultivate informal connections with central leaders who can
inﬂuence the personnel evaluation process. Another signiﬁcant variable in column 2 is the
tenure variable, the negative sign of which means that promotion (termination) is less likely
for leaders with longer (shorter) tenure. One plausible interpretation for this result is that
longer tenure without promotion may be a bad signal indicating lack of ability.
5.2 Turnover and Average Performance
The above analysis implicitly assumes that the central government makes decisions on the
turnover of provincial leaders solely on the basis of annual economic performance. While
this assumption is easy to justify empirically, it overlooks the fact that provincial leaders
are appointed oﬃcially for a ﬁve-year term. While no detailed evidence is available on
how the central government evaluates provincial leaders, casual observation suggests that
evaluations may rely on the cumulative or multiple-year performance rather than simply on
annual performance. The central government may prefer the average performance over a
span of years because it is a less noisy measure than the simple annual performance, which
puts too much weight on short-term shocks. Evaluations based on cumulative or average
performance can average out short-term shocks.
Although the oﬃcial term of a provincial leader is ﬁve years, in reality the term varies
from one to twelve years (Table 1). In order to incorporate the eﬀect of past performance so
as to make it ﬁt the personnel evaluation procedure discussed above, we create an average







where T is the number of years on the post up to the point of calculation, t is the t-th
year (t = 1,2,...,T − 1,T) and gt is the GDP growth in year t for a province. Thus, ˜ gT is
the moving average of GDP growth from the start year up to the current year in oﬃce, or
the GDP growth rate averaged over the tenure. This measure corresponds to a personnel
assessment mechanism in which there is an annual evaluation, but where the evaluation is
based on both the past and current performance in the post.
The last two columns of Table 3 report the results of regressions with the average
growth rate as the performance measure. Overall, regressions using the average growth
rate perform similarly to those using the annual one. Consistent with previous ﬁndings,
the promotion (termination) probability of provincial leaders increases (decreases) with the
average performance. Moreover, promotion and termination appear more sensitive to the
average growth rate than to the annual growth rate, because both the estimated coeﬃcients
and the corresponding marginal eﬀects of the average GDP growth rate are larger than those
of annual measures. The marginal eﬀect of average growth on promotion is 0.408 and that
on termination is -0.521 (estimated by speciﬁcation (4)), both are more than double those
of the annual growth. These numbers mean that when the average growth rate increases
0.06, the probability of promotion will increase by 33 percent of the average probability of
promotion, and the probability of termination will decrease by 30 percent of the average
probability of termination. This result is consistent with the argument that the average
measure is less likely to be subject to short-term shocks than the annual measure, and thus
weights more in turnover decisions made by the central government.
Our empirical ﬁndings lend support to the notion that the Chinese central government,
which holds complete power in relation to personnel control, acts in a way which is very
similar to the way in which the board of directors of a western corporation monitors and
disciplines its managers.19 The functioning of China’s personnel control system is remarkable
19See Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) and Weisbach (1988) on studies of the relationship between CEO
turnover and ﬁrm performance.
15in that it is made possible through centralized political control by the Communist Party in
an M-form economic structure.
6 Sensitivity Tests
In this section, we conduct several sensitivity tests to make sure that our major ﬁndings
are robust to alternative speciﬁcations. We ﬁrst check how sensitive our main ﬁndings are
when we use diﬀerent weights in calculating the average growth rates. We then test whether
nonlinearity of the tenure variable and the potential measurement error in the age65 variable
could cause any bias. Finally, we conduct some sensitivity tests to make sure our ﬁndings
are not mainly a result of the new retirement policy implemented in early 1980s.
6.1 Weights in Average Performance
Our previous measure of average growth performance implicitly assumes that each year
during a leader’s tenure has the same weight in the personnel evaluation. In reality, the
weight on each year may not be the same. To test how sensitive our major ﬁndings are when
we use diﬀerent weights in calculating the average growth rates, we allow the weight to diﬀer
across years.20 More speciﬁcally, we create a weighted measure of the GDP growth rate over






where r is the time-discount factor.
We allow r to take twenty diﬀerent values, which start from 0 and have an increment
of 0.1. For each value of r, we calculate the weighted growth rate, and use it to estimate
equations (1)-(3). Note that both the annual growth and the average growth measures used
above are special cases of gw. The annual growth rate corresponds to the case r = 0, while
the average growth rate corresponds to the case r = 1. When r > 1, the average performance
measure has more weights in earlier years.
Regressions alternating all twenty performance measures generate the results that sup-
port Hypothesis 1. The marginal eﬀects on all the weighted growth rates are positive and
20We thank Roger Gordon for making this suggestion.
16signiﬁcant.21 The magnitudes of the marginal eﬀects rise with r for r < 1.1, reach the peak
of 0.411 for promotion and -0.526 for termination at r = 1.1, and then start to decrease from
r > 1.2. However, none of these marginal eﬀects are statistically diﬀerent from each other.
Thus, even if the magnitude of the marginal eﬀect of the weighted growth rate varies with the
discount factor, this variation is not statistically signiﬁcant. Since the average performance
almost yields the largest marginal eﬀect,22 we use it for the following sensitivity tests.
6.2 Nonlinearity in the Eﬀect of Tenure
Our next sensitivity test addresses the nonlinearity in the eﬀect of tenure. While we only
allow tenure to have a linear eﬀect on turnover in the above estimations, its eﬀect may
well be nonlinear. On the one hand, longer tenure means more experience, which may in
turn translate into an asset for promotion. On the other hand, long years in the same post
without promotion may signal lack of ability. Thus, the net eﬀect may be either positive
or negative and it could be nonlinear. To allow for nonlinearity, we add the square term
of tenure as an independent variable. With the square term, both tenure and the square
term are insigniﬁcant, and they are also jointly insigniﬁcant (Table 4, column 1). This result
suggests that tenure may not have a quadratic eﬀect on turnover. However, tenure may still
have a nonlinear eﬀect in a non-quadratic way. For example, leaders on their second term in
the same post may have a disadvantage in upward mobility. We test this idea by including
a second term indicator. Indeed, the second term indicator has a strong negative eﬀect on
turnover, while the tenure itself is statistically insigniﬁcant (column 2). These results suggest
that leaders who have served for one term without promotion are in an unfavorable position
for turnover.
6.3 Measurement Error in the Age of 65
In our data, we only observe the birth year of a provincial leader but not the birth month.
This poses a potential measurement problem because in the year a leader reaches 65, a
21We do not report regression results due to space limitations. Interested readers can contact the authors
for these results.
22The likelihood function is also maximized around r = 1, lending support to our focus on the average
growth rate as the performance measure.
17turnover evaluation may be carried out in the months the leader is either below or above
65. To address this measurement error problem, we experiment using the age64 or age66
indicators rather than the age65 indicator. While the age64 and age66 indicators continue
to have a strong negative eﬀect on turnover, their eﬀects are smaller than that of age65
(Table 4, columns 3 and 4). These results suggest that age65 may still be the best variable
to measure the eﬀect of the forced retirement rule.
Because the implementation of the forced retirement rule at 65 only started in 1983, the
indicator variable age65 by itself may not accurately measure the eﬀect of the retirement rule.
To solve this problem, we include the age65 indicator interacted with a post-1982 indicator
to pick up the additional eﬀect of the forced retirement rule since 1982. The regression
with such an interaction term indeed shows that age65 only has a signiﬁcant eﬀect for the
post-1982 period (Table 4, column 5). The coeﬃcient on the age65 indicator itself is not
signiﬁcant, while that on age65*post-1982 indicator is highly signiﬁcant.23
6.4 Normal Retirements vs. Disciplinary Separations
Another possible problem with the regressions in section 5 is that many terminations in
the sample were the result of forced retirement at the age of 65 since 1983. Since normal
retirements are not disciplinary and we are not able to diﬀerentiate disciplinary separations
from normal retirement, our estimates of the disciplinary eﬀect of economic performance on
terminations may be biased. Results from summary statistics and regressions are mixed. On
the one hand, reaching the age of 65 indeed has a signiﬁcant impact on turnover. On the
other hand, the retirement rule was far from strictly enforced in the sample period, which
means that certain variables other than age must have played a role in terminations.
We employ two methods to more rigorously examine whether the forced retirement at
65 could cause a bias.24 First, we estimate the ordered probit model using a sample of leaders
younger than 65. Since these leaders have not reached the retirement age, their promotions
and terminations are most likely disciplinary. Second, we use the pre-1983 sub-sample to
23We also tried using the age65 indicator interacted with a post-1984 or post-1985 indicator, and the
results are similar.
24We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these methods.
18do the same estimations. Since the age-based retirement was not introduced until 1983,
turnover in the pre-1983 sub-sample are more likely to be disciplinary.
Regression results of both methods are reported in Table 5. Even though we have two
much smaller samples than before (648 observations for the ﬁrst sub-sample, and only 191
observations for the second sub-sample),25 regression results continue to support the hypoth-
esis that the probability of promotion (termination) increases (decreases) with a provincial
leader’s economic performance. The average growth rate has a positive coeﬃcient, and it
is signiﬁcant at at least the ﬁve percent level. The magnitudes of these coeﬃcients and the
marginal eﬀects are even larger than those using the full sample, which clearly implies that
our main results are not driven by the retirement rule launched in early 1980s.
In summary, the regression results in Tables 3-5 show that the Chinese central gov-
ernment tends to promote provincial leaders who perform well economically and terminate
provincial leaders who perform poorly. Regressions show that the average performance over
years has a larger marginal eﬀect on turnover than the annual performance, although the
diﬀerence between the two is not statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, the main ﬁnding that
economic performance matters for provincial leaders’ career prospects is robust to various
sensitivity tests.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the relationship between the turnover of provincial leaders
and their economic performance. We ﬁnd that the likelihood of promotion (termination)
of provincial leaders increases (decreases) with their economic performance. This ﬁnding
supports the view that the Chinese central government uses personnel control to motivate
local oﬃcials to promote local economic growth. We also ﬁnd that the turnover of provincial
leaders is more sensitive to their tenure-averaged performance than to their annual perfor-
mance. These results support the hypothesis that the Chinese economy is run in such a way
that provincial leaders act like middle managers of a large corporation and their internal
25The variable second term indicator does not have enough variation in the second sub-sample and is
therefore dropped in the estimations.
19career mobility is closely tied to their economic performance (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001).
China started its transition from a planned economy to a market economy with some
bold reforms in the government system. In particular, it decentralized the ﬁscal system in
1980 so that the central and local governments shared ﬁscal revenues according to certain
sharing contracts. The ﬁscal decentralization has motivated local oﬃcials to lend a “helping
hand” in pushing forward local economic growth (Jin et al., 2000). Another equally im-
portant reform, the reform of the personnel management system, was carried out at almost
the same time, but its signiﬁcance has long been overlooked in the literature. In this sense,
our ﬁndings should help to draw attention to the role of China’s internal political market
which not only provides incentives to local oﬃcials to promote economic growth, but also
integrates the decentralized central-local ﬁscal mechanism in China.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variables N  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
          
Promotion 864  0.075  0.264  0  1 
          
Termination 864  0.103  0.304  0  1 
          
Age 864  60.37  5.82  43  75 
          
Age65 864  0.250  0.433  0  1 
          
Education (college=1, lower=0)  864  0.618  0.486  0  1 
          
Central Connection  864  0.234  0.423  0  1 
          
Tenure 864  3.032  2.115  1  12 
          
Second term indicator (tenure>5)  864  0.082  0.275  0  1 
          
Provincial annual GDP growth  864  0.104  0.060  -0.159  0.504 
          
Average GDP growth   864  0.098  0.045  -0.159  0.296 
          
Lagged Provincial per capita GDP 
(one-year lag) (1000 yuan) 
864 0.950  0.870  0.194  6.939 
          
 
Note: The observation unit is provincial leader-year.  Promotion is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
provincial leader (the provincial party secretary or governor) is promoted and zero otherwise.  Termination 
includes both retirement and demotion for provincial leaders. It equals 1 if termination occurs and 0 
otherwise.  Age65 equals 1 if a leader is 65 or older and 0 otherwise. Central connection is 1 if the leader 
has previous working experience or currently holds a joint appointment in the central government and 0 
otherwise.  Tenure is the number of years a leader has been in the post.  Second term indicator equals 1 if 
the leader has been in the post for more than 5 years, and 0 otherwise.  Average GDP growth rate is the 
GDP growth rate averaged over the tenure of a provincial leader. All GDP measures are calculated at 1980 
constant prices.   25
 
Table 2: The Frequency of Political Turnover by Age 
            
  Whole sample    Post-1985 sub-sample 
      
Age  Promotion  Termination  Same level    Promotion  Termination  Same level 
              
              
40-49     35        23 
50-59 28  5  296    24  3  229 
              
60 8  1  44    7  1  40 
61 4  2  47    4  2  37 
62 3  4  52    3  2  35 
63 7  6  49    3  3  24 
64 5  4  48    2  2  23 
              
65   12  42      8  15 
66 5  13  28    2  7  7 
67 2  13  21      3  2 
68 1  9  13      3   
69   5  10         
              
70-75 2  15  25        
              
Total cases  65  89  710    45  32  458 
            
 
Note: The observation unit is provincial leader-year. 
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Table 3: Ordered Probit Regressions Estimating the Effect of Economic Performance on the Turnover of 
Provincial Leaders (Whole sample) 
  
Dependent variable: turnover 
(0=termination, 1=same level, 2=promotion) 
 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      





      




      




      




      




      




      




      




      








      








      
Number  of  observations  864 864 864 864 
Log  pseudo-likelihood  -468 -414 -462 -410 
      
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios based on robust standard errors. The significance levels of 
1%, 5%, and 10% are noted by ***, **, and *.  All regressions include the provincial and year indicators. 
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Table 4: Ordered Probit Regressions Estimating the Effect of Economic Performance on the Turnover of 
Provincial Leaders (Sensitivity tests using the whole sample) 
  
Dependent variable: turnover 
(0=termination, 1=same level, 2=promotion) 
 
  
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
        


























   -0.402 
(-1.64) 
        
Age64     -0.682*** 
(-3.90) 
  
        
Age66      -0.712*** 
(-3.54) 
 
        
Age65*post-1982        -0.979*** 
(-3.36) 











        





















        
Tenure squared  -0.001 
(-0.13) 
     
        








        










        










        










        
Number  of  observations  864 864 864  864 864 
Log  pseudo-likelihood  -410 -408 -417  -416 -402 
        
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios based on robust standard errors. The significance levels of 
1%, 5%, and 10% are noted by ***, **, and *.  All regressions include the provincial and year indicators.   28
Table 5: Ordered Probit Regressions Estimating the Effect of Average Economic Performance on the 
Turnover of Provincial Leaders (Two sub-samples) 
  
Dependent variable: turnover 
(0=termination, 1=same level, 2=promotion) 
 
              
  Sub-sample for age<65    Pre-1983 sub-sample 
         
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
         








         
Age   -0.005 
(-0.29) 
   -0.077** 
(-2.10) 
         
Age65  
 
    -0.437 
(-1.49) 
         
Education   0.477** 
(2.14) 
   -0.639** 
(-2.10) 
         
Central connection    0.292 
(1.54) 
   0.293 
(0.77) 
         
Tenure   0.034 
(0.70) 
   -0.020 
(-0.12) 
         
Second term indicator (tenure>5)    -0.782** 
(-2.32) 
    
         
Lagged per capita GDP (million yuan)    -0.301 
(-1.13) 
   0.001 
(0.31) 
         
Provincial  indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         








         








         
Number of observations  648  648    191  191 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -241  -231    -97  -90 
         
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios based on robust standard errors. The significance levels of 
1%, 5%, and 10% are noted by ***, **, and *.  All regressions include the provincial and year indicators. 
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